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A primary change to crop insurance contained in the USDA's Farm Bill Proposal is 
Supplemental Deductible Coverage (SDC).  SDC would allow farmers who purchase 
individual crop insurance coverage to purchase GRP in the amount of the individual 
policy deductible.  GRP indemnities would be accelerated compared with the current 
GRP policy.  Analysis indicates that SDC provides substantial benefits in terms of 
certainty equivalent gains.  The largest benefits are realized by low risk farmers, 
compared to others in the county, and farmers whose yields are highly correlated with the 
county yield.  Optimal individual policy coverage levels generally decrease when SDC is 
taken. 
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The Administration recently released the USDA 2007 Farm Bill Proposal (USDA 
2007a).  Among its recommendations are several proposed modifications of current crop 
insurance programs under Title X (USDA 2007b).  The first recommendation presented 
under these is Crop Insurance Supplemental Deductible Coverage.  This proposed 
Supplemental Deductible Coverage would “Allow farmers to purchase supplemental 
insurance that would cover all or part of their individual policy deductible in the event of 
a county or area wide loss” (USDA 2007b, p. 151).   
Supplemental Deductible Coverage (SDC) would improve the safety net for 
producers by offering full coverage (100% of the value of expected yield) in the event of 
a more widespread disaster.  Buying the highest currently available coverage level (85%) 
is relatively expensive, especially in high risk areas, and still requires the farmer to bear 
the first 15% of any loss, which for some farmers exceeds their profit margin.  The hope 
is that offering SDC will increase the effective coverage taken by Federal Crop Insurance 
Program participants and thus reduce the need for disaster assistance.   
Offering SDC raises several questions.  Farmers would likely find such coverage 
useful, but what types of farmers and in which areas?  SDC is targeted at helping “fill the 
gap” in available insurance coverage for farmers in high risk areas subject to multiple 
year losses.  How effective is SDC as a risk management tool for such farmers?  If SDC 
were offered over a wide region (e.g., the Great Plains states), would farmers in low risk 
areas also find it valuable or even more valuable than farmers in high risk areas?  Besides 
farmer demand and welfare questions, how would SDC affect farmer behavior?  In 
   1particular, how would optimal APH coverage levels change when APH is combined with 
area-wide coverage through SDC?  Would offering SDC encourage farmers in high risk 
areas to farm land they would not otherwise farm or shift their crop allocation to favor 
one or more crops?  If such acreage effects occur, what are the environmental 
consequences?  In addition, SDC raises questions about program efficiency.  Specifically, 
how would SDC affect total crop insurance subsidies, administrative and operating 
reimbursements to insurance companies, moral hazard, and program fraud and abuse? 
To answer some of these questions surrounding SDC, we estimate changes in 
farmer welfare with each policy (APH alone, GRP alone, APH with SDC, APH with 
SDC with accelerated payout) under a variety of empirically-based assumptions 
regarding farm and county yields.  This analysis identifies the types of farmers who 
would find SDC most beneficial, in particular, indicating how much such a program 
benefits farmers in high risk areas relative to those in low risk areas.  In addition, the 
analysis identifies the preferred coverage level under each policy, to determine how 
farmers would likely adjust coverage levels if SDC became available.  The analysis 
indicates the regions and crops where farmers would find the proposed SDC most useful, 
provides monetary estimates of its farmer level benefits, and indicates how farmers 
would likely use the policy to manage their risk.   
 
Proposed SDC Program Structure 
The description of the proposed SDC program structure (USDA 2007b) indicates 
that the program would be an option to the existing APH yield insurance policy.  For this 
policy, farmers choose an APH coverage level as a percentage of the insured unit’s 
historical average yield, with available coverage levels range from 50% to as high as 85% 
   2in 5% intervals.  Under this policy, 100% minus the chosen APH coverage level serves as 
a deductible to ensure that farmers share in the risk of loss so as to have incentives to use 
appropriate production practices to mitigate the potential for losses.  The proposed SDC 
would allow insured farmers to buy GRP as a supplement to their APH policy, with a 
maximum liability for this supplemental coverage equal to their APH deductible.  Thus 
with APH and GRP combined under SDC, the maximum liability for the GRP component 
would be their APH deductible, which is equal to one minus their APH coverage level 
multiplied by the product of their APH yield and chosen insurance price guarantee.  Thus, 
the total liability (maximum indemnity) with APH under the SDC option would be 100% 
of the crop’s expected value.   
We use the following language from the Farm Bill proposal to construct the 
specifics regarding the SDC proposal: 
“[I]f the county yield is at or below 70 percent of the county average, producers 
would receive a payment equal to 100 percent of the loss not covered by the crop 
insurance payment under their individual policy. If the county yield is between 90 
and 70 percent of the county average, the producer would receive a proportional 
amount of the loss not covered by the crop insurance payment. And if the 
countywide loss is less than 90 percent, no deductible payment would be 
triggered.” (USDA 2007b, p. 154) 
 
This language implies that a 90% GRP coverage level will be used for SDC; that is the 
county yield would have to be less than 90% of the GRP expected county yield before an 
SDC indemnity will be paid.  In addition, a more rapid payout of indemnities will be used 
than is the case for GRP.  GRP pays indemnities proportional to the county yield loss, 
with 100% of the coverage only paid when the county yield is 0, which is a highly 
unlikely event for most crops in most counties.  To improve the effectiveness of SDC 
coverage, this language indicates that 100% of the SDC liability (the APH deductible) 
   3will be paid when the county yield is 70% of the expected county yield (as opposed to 
0% for GRP).  Figure 1 graphically illustrates the difference between the two indemnity 
payment schedules—both have the same maximum payout, but this maximum is reached 
more quickly with the accelerated payment rate.   
 
Indemnities 
To clarify the structure of the proposed SDC program, we report equations for 
farmer indemnities under the different policies analyzed.  The farmer indemnity ($/ac) 
with APH (Iaph) is 
(1)  Iaph(CLaph) = max(CLaphμf – yf, 0)Paph, 
where CLaph is the chosen APH coverage level, μf is the farm unit’s mean yield as 
determined from the unit’s actual production history, yf is the realized farm unit yield, 
and Paph is the APH price determined by the RMA and used to value yield losses.
1  The 
APH coverage level CLaph is a percentage of the farm unit’s average yield (μf) chosen by 
the farmer as the unit’s yield guarantee.  Available coverage level options are 50% to 
85% in 5% increments.  Hence, CLaphμf in equation (1) is the farm unit’s per acre yield 
guarantee and the expression in the max(·) operator determines the unit’s per acre yield 
loss relative to this guarantee.  Finally, this loss is valued at the established price Paph for 
paying indemnities.  
The farmer indemnity ($/ac) with GRP (Igrp) is  











where MaxProtgrp is the GRP maximum protection per acre ($/ac) established by the 
RMA (equal to the policy’s maximum liability), CLgrp is the GRP coverage level, μc is 
   4the county mean yield, and yc is the realized county yield.  The GRP coverage level CLgrp 
is a percentage of the county average yield (μc) chosen by the farmer as the yield 
guarantee or trigger for paying indemnities.  For GRP, multiple coverage level options 
are available, but SDC will use an indemnity trigger equivalent to the 90% GRP coverage 
level.  In equation (2), CLgrpμc is the GRP per acre county yield guarantee based on the 
coverage level chosen, the expression in the max(·) operator is the percentage yield loss 
(i.e., the percentage that the observed county yield falls below the county yield 
guarantee), and the indemnity is the product of this percentage loss and the total liability 
MaxProtgrp.
2  
The per acre farmer indemnity for APH combined with SDC coverage with a 
standard GRP payment rate (Isdc_stnd) is 











where Daph(CLaph) = (1 – CLaph)μf Paph is the APH deductible ($/ac) as a function of the 
APH coverage level.  Equation (3) is the APH indemnity plus a GRP-based indemnity 
using a 90% GRP coverage level trigger, but with the APH deducible (Daph) replacing the 
GRP maximum protection per acre (MaxProtgrp).  APH combined with SDC coverage 
with a standard GRP payment rate is not the policy proposed in the USDA’s 2007 Farm 
Bill, but is analyzed here as a useful counterfactual for comparison.   
The per acre farmer indemnity for APH combined with SDC coverage with an 
accelerated GRP payment rate (Isdc_accl) is 
(4)  Isdc_accl(CLaph) = Iaph(CLaph) + Daph(CLaph) 0.9







⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
, 
   5where all variables are as previously defined.  Equation (4) is the APH indemnity plus a 
modified GRP indemnity.  Again, a 90% GRP coverage level is used and the APH 
deducible replaces the GRP maximum protection per acre.  However, the GRP 
percentage yield loss (the term in the max(·) operator) is calculated as a percentage of 
0.9μc – 0.7μc, not the county yield guarantee of 0.9μc.  Since the term in the denominator 
in equation (4) is smaller than in equation (3), the percentage yield loss in equation (4) is 
larger than in equation (3), so indemnities are larger.  However, the percentage yield loss 
is no longer limited to be less than 100%, so the min(·) operator limits the percentage 
yield loss used to pay indemnities to 100%.  Figure 1 illustrates the difference between 
the GRP-based components of the SDC indemnity in equation (3) and equation (4).  Also, 
to follow the USDA’s 2007 Farm Bill proposal, equation (4) uses 70% of the county 
expected yield as the level at which the GRP component pays 100% of the APH 
deductible; other percentages are possible, but not examined here.   
 
Conceptual Framework and Analytical Methods 
The analysis goal is to determine how combining SDC with APH affects farmer 
welfare as measured by changes in certainty equivalents ($/ac) and farmer behavior as 
indicated by changes in optimal APH coverage levels.  Here we explain our modeling 
approach and its empirical implementation.  We first specify a parametric model of 
correlated county and farm yields, as well as farmer revenue and utility.  Next, we 
describe empirical implementation of Monte Carlo integration for calculating expected 
utility and actuarially fair premiums.  Finally, we specify the farmer’s optimization 
problem—choosing the APH coverage level to maximize the expected utility of revenue 
   6from crop production, and then explain how the solutions will be used to examine the 
effects of SDC on farmer welfare and optimal APH coverage levels.   
County and Farm Yields 
An important aspect of this analysis is how farm yields related to county yields, 
since the GRP-based component of SDC is based on the county yield.  The overall goal is 
to understand what portion of the farm variability is due to idiosyncratic effects and what 
portion is systemic.  Several approaches have been developed for modeling the 
connection between county and farm yields.  Recently, Deng et al. (2007) describe a 
multiplicative model in which the farm yield is some random proportion of the realized 
county yield.  In this case, the mean of this random proportion determines the farm mean 
yield relative to the county yield while the variance of this random proportion partially 
determines the proportion of the farm variability due to idiosyncratic effects.  More 
commonly used is an additive model in which the farm yield is the product of a constant 
factor and the realized county yield plus some random idiosyncratic error.  Originally 
described by Miranda (1991) to examine area yield crop insurance (e.g., GRP), Atwood 
et al. (1996) used the model to develop premiums for income protection, Carriquiry et al. 
(2005) used it to propose improvements for making APH premiums, and Ramaswami and 
Roe (2004) derived its micro-production function foundations.   
Without actual farm unit yield histories from crop insurance policies available for 
use, we did not pursue a multiplicative or additive model to connect farm and county 
yields.  Rather, we used a parametric approach, specifying commonly used probability 
distributions for county and farm yields (Goodwin and Ker, 2002), and captured different 
relative levels of systemic and idiosyncratic yield variability by varying the correlation 
   7between county and farmer yields.  The implication is that farm and county yields have a 
joint distribution in which the two marginal distributions and their correlation are known.  
Hence, the final stochastic model of farm and county yields is specified by five 
parameters—the mean and standard deviation of both farm and county yields and the 
correlation (or covariance) between farm and county yield.   
For empirical analysis, we use a lognormal distribution for county yield, an 
assumption consistent with the analysis of Deng et al. (2007).  An important advantage of 
the lognormal distribution is that when simulating county yields, negative realizations are 
not possible.  In high risk counties with relatively low mean county yields and high 
standard deviations, the likelihood of negative county yields is not negligible for a normal 
distribution, so that ad hoc fixes would be required for simulated yields.  For each county 
examined, the mean county yield is set equal to the 2007 expected county yield for GRP 
as published in the official actuarial documents for each county (USDA-RMA 2007a).  
The standard deviation for each county was calibrated so that the actuarially fair premium 
rate for the simulated county yields with 90% GRP coverage matched the published 
unsubsidized GRP rate for 90% coverage as published in the official actuarial documents 
for each county (USDA-RMA 2007a).  Table 1 lists the resulting means and standard 
deviations of county yield for the four counties examined here (as well as the APH price 
and GRP maximum protection per acre).  Tripp County, South Dakota and Hamilton 
County, Iowa respectively represent a high risk and a low risk county for producing corn, 
while Andrews County, Texas and Coahoma County, Mississippi respectively represent a 
high risk and a low risk county for producing cotton.   
   8For empirical analysis, we use a beta distribution for farm unit yields, a common 
assumption (Goodwin and Ker (2002) review several examples).  For each county, we 
examine results for two types of producers—farmers with mean yield 25% below the 
county average yield and farmers with mean yield 25% above the county average yield.  
The standard deviations for farm yield were calculated so that the implied coefficient of 
variation for the farm yield was 150% of the coefficient of variation for county yield.  
Finally, since the beta distribution requires specifying the minimum and maximum, we 
follow Babcock et al. (2004) and set minimum yield to zero and maximum yield to the 
mean plus two standard deviations.  Table 1 reports the resulting means and standard 
deviations of farm yield for farms with below average and with above average yields in 
the four counties examined here.  The resulting distributions of farm yield are generally 
consistent with published results for dryland production of corn and cotton (e.g., Coble, 
Heifner and Zuniga 2000; Coble, Zuniga, and Heifner 2003; Hennessy et al. 1997).   
The final parameter needed to specify the relationship between farm and county 
yields is their covariance.  Little published data regarding observed farm and county yield 
covariances for a range of crops and counties exists (e.g., Hennessy et al. (1997) report 
0.8 as the average correlation for ten farms for a single crop in a single county).  As a 
result, we selected three levels for Pearson’s correlation coefficient between farm and 
county yields (0.3, 0.6, 0.9) as examples of farms with low, moderate and high yield 
correlation with the county yield to capture a wide range of correlations.   
 
Farmer Revenue and Insurance Premiums 
For this analysis, farm revenue is crop revenue (the product of the non-random 
price and random yield) plus the indemnity minus the premium, where both the 
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non-random production costs given the difficulty in consistent estimation of such costs 
for different types of producers in different counties across states.  However, the 
empirical analysis is constructed so that results can be easily adjusted to include cost 
differences for those who wish to do so.  Thus, farmer returns ($/ac) for insurance 
program i ∈{none, aph, grp, sdc_stnd, sdc_accl} are 
(5)  πi(CLaph) = Paphyf + Ii(CLaph) – Mi(CLaph),  
where Mi(CLaph) is the per acre farmer premium for insurance program i as a function of 
the APH coverage level.  The subscript none implies no insurance with Inone and Mnone 
equal zero.  The analysis uses a non-random price to focus only on yield risk and uses the 
published APH price for all crops and policies as an easily available estimate of the 
expected crop price at harvest.  Indemnities for each insurance policy are as defined by 
equation (1)-(4), but premiums remain undefined.   
For farmer premiums, we analyze these insurance policies using actuarially fair 
premium rates generated as the expected value of the indemnity derived through the 
Monte Carlo integration process.  Premiums currently include subsidies so that farmers 
pay less than what the RMA considers actuarially fair.  Table 2 reports the current 
premium subsidy rates for all APH and GRP coverage levels.  Since these premium 
subsidies are included in all current actual premiums, we use these same subsidy rates in 
our analysis.  Since indemnities for SDC combined with APH are a combination of APH 
and GRP-based indemnities, premiums for APH combined with SDC use the APH 
subsidy rate for the APH portion of the premium and the 90% GRP subsidy rate for the 
   10SDC portion of the premium.  Since all crop insurance premiums are currently 
subsidized, we do not report results for unsubsidized premiums.   
As previously explained, the county yield standard deviations were calibrated so 
that the simulated fair GRP premium rate matched the actual GRP rate.  Thus by 
construction, our subsidized SDC premiums are equal to actual 90% coverage GRP 
premiums with the maximum protection per acre equal to the APH deductible.  However, 
for SDC with an accelerated payment rate, the available GRP premium information does 
not allow calibration of simulated premiums to equal published premiums.  Therefore, 
premium rates for the accelerated coverage were derived through Monte Carlo integration 
using the modified accelerated indemnity function reported in equation (4).  APH 
premiums used in the analysis were also derived through the Monte Carlo integration, 
based on the assumption that the farm yield coefficient of variation is equal to 150% of 
the county yield coefficient of variation derived from the unsubsidized GRP premium 
rate for 90% coverage.  
 
Farmer Utility 
As an approximation of farmer risk preferences, we use a negative exponential 
utility function.  Because negative exponential utility implies constant absolute risk 
aversion (CARA), the analysis does not require assumptions concerning farmer wealth or 
income from outside activities.  Thus, farmer utility from per acre returns for insurance 
program i ∈{none, aph, grp, sdc_stnd, sdc_accl} is 
(6)  Ui(CLaph) = 1 – exp(–Rπi(CLaph)), 
where R is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and πi is as defined by equation (5).  
Following the lead of Babcock et al. (1993), the coefficient R for the empirical analysis 
   11was calibrated for each parameter set examined so that the implied farmer risk premium 
with no insurance was equal to 30% of the returns standard deviation.  The resulting 
values for R are reported in Table 1 for farms with mean yields 25% above and 25% 
below the county mean.   
Farmer expected utility for each policy is the expected value of equation (6): 
(7)  EUi(CLaph) = E[1 – exp(–Rπi(CLaph))] =  1 exp( ( )) ( | ) i aph i aph R CL dF CL
π ππ −− ∫ , 
where F(πi | CLaph) is the cumulative distribution function of random farmer returns for 
the given APH coverage level.  As equation (5) indicates, πi is a transformation of farm 
yield yf both directly through Paphyf and indirectly through the indemnity, so that for most 
of the polices analyzed, the actual conditional distribution function F(πi | CLaph) is 
generally difficult to express due to the farm and county yield distributions used and the 
truncated nature of insurance indemnities.  Furthermore, the transformation of returns πi 
by the utility function creates additional nonlinearity so that closed-form analytical 
solutions for expected utility do not exist for any of the policies analyzed.  As a result, 
numerical methods are needed to calculate expected utility; for the analysis here, we use 
Monte Carlo integration.   
 
Empirical Implementation  
Monte Carlo integration is a widely used technique to approximate multiple 
integrals of complex functions.  Greene (2003) provides an overview of the methodology, 
with numerous applications in agriculture and crop insurance available (e.g., Hennessy et 
al. 1997; Hurley et al. 2004; Mitchell et al. 2004; Seo et al. 2005).  Here we use Monte 
Carlo integration to approximate the integration required to calculate the expected utility 
   12as expressed in equation (7) and to calculate actuarially fair premiums equal to the 
expected value of the appropriate indemnities.   
The basic intuition of the method is that the expected value of a complex function 
of random variables is approximated by drawing pseudo-random numbers from the 
appropriate distributions, transforming these draws with the same function, and then 
calculating the sample average.  More formally, if x is a vector of random variables from 
some joint distribution and g(·) is a vector valued function, then the expected value of 








≅∑ k is a pseudo-random draw of x and 
K is the total number of such pseudo-random draws.  As K becomes large, the 
approximation converges.  The key for empirical implementation is generating pseudo-
random variables from the appropriate distributions.   
For the empirical analysis here, the fundamental random variables are county and 
farm unit yields; all other random variables are functions of these two random variables 
and other parameters.  A set of pseudo-random draws for a single variable can be 
generated using the inverse distribution function technique, which begins with a set of 
uniform random draws and transforms each draw through the inverse of the cumulative 
distribution function.  Random draws for multiple random variables from different 
distributions can be generated by beginning with separate sets of uniform random 
variables.  For the application here, the inverse of the lognormal and the beta distribution 
functions are needed to generate yields.  The empirical problem for the analysis here is 
that county and farm yields need to be appropriately correlated. 
For the analysis here, we use the method of Richardson and Condra (1981) 
explained in more detail by Fackler (1991), to draw vectors of county and farm yields 
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standard normal random variables.  Multiplying these by the Cholesky decomposition of 
the desired variance-covariance matrix gives correlated normal random variables, which 
are transformed to correlated uniform random variables using the normal cumulative 
distribution function.  Finally, these correlated uniform random variables are transformed 
to yields with the correlation implied by the original variance-covariance matrix using the 
appropriately parameterized inverse of the required cumulative distribution function 
(lognormal for county yield, beta for farm yield).  See Goodwin and Ker (2002) for an 
overview of empirical methods used for generating correlated random variables, 
including a discussion of the merits and weaknesses with the method used here.   
The Monte Carlo integration for this analysis was implemented in Microsoft 
Excel 2003.  Standard normal random variables were generated using the data analysis 
tool provided with the software and transformations were calculated using the software’s 
distribution and inverse distribution functions.  Experimentation indicated that 10,000 
random draws were sufficient for results to converge.   
 
Analyzing Supplemental Deductible Coverage 
The analysis assumes farmers behave optimally and choose the APH coverage 
level that maximizes their expected utility.  Mathematically, the farmer’s problem is: 
(8)   =  ,  max ( )
pah
i aph CL EU CL max 1 exp( ( )) ( | )
aph
i aph i aph CL RC L d F C L
π ππ −− ∫
where CLaph ∈{0%, 50%, 55%, 60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, 85%} is the farmer’s choice 
variable.  CLaph = 0% is no insurance (i = none) when examining the current APH policy 
alone (i = aph) and is 90% GRP coverage (i = grp) when examining either of the SDC 
policies (i = sdc_stnd or i = sdc_accl).  This choice set for CLaph collapses the five 
   14insurance policies into three scenarios to analyze: APH alone (i = aph), APH combined 
with SDC using a standard GRP payment rate (i = sdc_stnd), and APH combined with 
SDC using an accelerated GRP payment rate (i = sdc_accl).  Simulations were conducted 
for all possible APH coverage levels and a simple search identified the optimal APH 
coverage level ( ) and associated optimal expected utility (
*
_ aph i CL
*
i EU ) for each of these 
three scenarios.  Next, these optimal expected utilities were converted into the associated 
optimal certainty equivalents ($/ac) for each scenario: 
(9)  . 
** ln(1 )/ ii CE EU R =− −
Figure 2 illustrates sample results for Tripp County South Dakota and Hamilton 
County Iowa under the specifics indicated by the figure legend.  The three lines in each 
plot indicate farmer certainty equivalents for all APH coverage levels for each scenario as 
labeled.  From the data used to generate these plots, the optimal APH coverage level 
( ) and associated optimal certainty equivalent ( ) was identified for the three 
scenarios for each parameterization.  The vertical gap between the three lines is the 
increase in farmer certainty equivalents when a farmer switches from APH alone to APH 
with SDC with a standard or with an accelerated payment rate.  Because so many 
parameterizations were analyzed, to conserve space, the optimal coverage levels and 
certainty equivalents for each parameterization are not reported, but are available on 
request from the authors.   
*
_ aph i CL
*
i CE
The presentation of results focuses on changes in optimal coverage levels and 
certainty equivalents between the scenarios to provide monetary estimates of the farmer 
level benefits of SDC and to determine how farmers would likely adjust APH coverage 
levels if SDC became available.  Changes in optimal certainty equivalents between using 
   15the current APH policy alone and either APH combined with SDC using a standard GRP 
payment rate or with SDC using an accelerated GRP payment rate are estimates of the 
farm level benefits of the proposed SDC policy.  Changes in the optimal APH coverage 
levels between the current APH policy alone and either APH combined with SDC using a 
standard GRP payment rate or with SDC using an accelerated GRP payment rate indicate 
how farmers would likely adjust APH coverage levels if SDC became available.   
 
Results 
Table 3 reports the increase in farmer certainty equivalents (as $/ac and as a 
percentage) when switching from using APH alone to using APH combined with either 
SDC using the standard GRP payment rate or the accelerated payment rate.  Table 4 
reports the decrease in the optimal APH coverage level associated with switching from 
APH alone to APH combined with either type of SDC examined.  Based on the results in 
these tables, we draw several generalizations regarding the effect of SDC as proposed in 
the USDA’s 2007 Farm Bill.   
 
Farmer Benefits from SDC 
For all cases in Table 3, SDC generates positive benefits relative to APH alone, 
implying that all farmers would find some benefit from SDC.  We focus initially on 
results with the accelerated payment rate, as this is the proposed program.  In Tripp 
County, SDC generates a substantial benefit for corn farmers, with benefits ranging from 
over $6/ac to almost $19/ac with the accelerated payment rate; benefits in Hamilton 
County are smaller, ranging $5/ac to $16/ac.  The relative benefit of SDC in Tripp 
County is also much larger, since Tripp County is less productive; SDC increases farmer 
   16certainty equivalents 4% to almost 8% there, but only 1% to 2% in Hamilton County.  
SDC with the accelerated payment rate generates benefits ranging about $8/ac to $24/ac 
in Andrews County and Coahoma County, with comparable benefits essentially equal in 
both counties.  However, since Andrews County is less productive, the relative benefit is 
larger, implying a 7% to 12% increase in certainty equivalents, versus a 2% to 4% 
increase in Coahoma County.  Farmer benefits from SDC with the standard payment rate 
are lower, indicating the essential nature of the accelerated payment rate in order for SDC 
to generate a significant farmer benefit.  Farmer benefits with the standard payment rate 
are less than $3.50/ac for the corn cases examined and less than $7.40/ac for the cotton 
cases examined.   
In Table 3, high risk farmers (those with a mean yield 25% below the county 
mean) receive smaller benefits than low risk farmers (those with a mean yield 25% above 
the county mean) in the same county.  This generalization holds for all cases examined 
with the accelerated payment rate, with the $/ac benefit decreasing for high risk farmers 
enough so that the percentage increase in farmer certainty equivalents is essentially the 
same for low and high risk farmers with the same farm-county yield correlation in the 
same county.  However, exceptions to this generalization occur in Table 3 for farmers 
with yields highly correlated with the county yield (ρfc = 0.90); in these cases, low risk 
farmers tend to realize larger percentage increases in certainty equivalents.  
In Table 3, as the farm-county yield correlation increases, the benefits from SDC 
increase, since SDC indemnities are more likely to coincide with poor farm yield 
performance.  As the yield correlation increases, farmers with higher mean yields receive 
greater benefits than those with lower mean yields, since the overall value of production 
   17increases.  Finally, with the accelerated payment rate, benefits for cotton farmers are 
larger than for comparable corn farmers, ranging $2 to $8 more per acre.  With the 
standard payment rate, benefits for corn and cotton farmers are generally similar, though 
benefits for cotton farmers always exceed those for comparable corn farmers. 
 
Effect of SDC on Optimal APH Coverage Levels 
The coverage offered by SDC not only complements APH coverage, which 
increases the farmer’s certainty equivalent as seen in Table 3, but SDC also substitutes 
for APH, which can imply a reduction in the optimal APH coverage level.  Thus, for all 
cases in Table 4, the optimal APH coverage with SDC either decreases or remains 
unchanged—the optimal APH coverage level never increases when APH is combined 
with SDC.  The decrease is as large as 35 percentage points with the accelerated payment 
rate (i.e., a shift from the 85% to the 50% coverage level).  With the standard payment 
rate, the optimal coverage level generally decreases no more than 5 percentage points, 
except for a few cases when it becomes optimal to discontinue APH (0% APH coverage 
level) and use GRP.   
With the accelerated payment rate, a farm’s mean yield has no effect on the 
decrease in the optimal APH coverage level for all cases in Table 4 within the same 
county with the same farm-county yield correlation.  Indeed, though not reported here, 
with the accelerated payment rate the optimal APH coverage level in a county does not 
change with the farm’s mean yield.  Comparing across crops and counties, the coverage 
level decrease in Tripp and Hamilton counties shows a larger decrease in Tripp, while the 
decrease is about the same in Andrews and Coahoma counties.   
   18As the farm yield becomes more correlated with the county yield, the 
effectiveness of SDC as a substitute for APH increases and so the optimal APH coverage 
level with SDC should decrease or remain unchanged.  This shift in optimal APH 
coverage occurs for all cases examined in Table 4.  With the accelerated payment rate, 
the optimal coverage level decreases 25 to 35 percentage points for a farm with a farm-
county yield correlation of 0.9 compared to 0.3.  Indeed, though not reported, for all cases 
examined, the optimal APH coverage level for SDC with the accelerated payment rate is 
50% if the yield correlation is 0.9.   
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
  Our results indicate that SDC, as structured under the USDA Farm Bill Proposal, 
has substantial welfare benefits for all of the farms analyzed.  A key provision of the 
proposal giving rise to those benefits is the accelerated indemnity schedule for the 
supplemental GRP portion of the coverage.  Benefits are positive but modest in 
magnitude under standard GRP but are much larger with the accelerated indemnity 
function.  Other primary results can be summarized as follows. 
•  Within a county, benefits of SDC are larger for low risk farmers than for 
high risk farmers.  This might be viewed as a positive attribute of SDC 
since some other aspects of the crop insurance program, such as 
proportional premium subsidies, can be viewed as more beneficial to high 
risk farmers. 
•  SDC offers larger benefits for farms with yields that are highly correlated 
with the county yield.  Thus, the demand for the coverage would likely be 
   19greater in regions where systemic risks account for a large proportion of 
total yield risk. 
•  In most cases, with the accelerated payment rate, optimal APH coverage 
levels decrease modestly — 5% to 10% — when SDC is taken.  However, 
the decrease in APH coverage is in the 30% to 35% range for farms with 
yields that are highly correlated with the county yield. 
  The results of our analysis should prove useful to policy makers in understanding 
the potential contribution of SDC to the overall effectiveness of the Federal Crop 
Insurance Program.  One other beneficial aspect of SDC that should be noted is that the 
shift from individual coverage to area coverage would reduce the potential for moral 
hazard, fraud, and program abuse because a smaller proportion of total program liability 
would be for individual coverage and because these problems are believed to be less 
serious when coverage levels on individual coverage are lower. 
   20Endnotes 
1. Farmers have the option of insuring at less than 100% of the RMA determined 
expected price but insurance program experience has shown that the vast majority of 
participants choose coverage based on the maximum available price election. 
2. Here we assume that the producer takes the GRP maximum protection per acre 
published in the RMA county actuarial documents.  Producers are allowed to choose 
amounts of coverage per acre less than this value, but most GRP participants choose to 
insure the maximum protection per acre. 
 




   21Table 1. Parameters used for empirical analysis of supplemental deductible coverage.   
 
 ----------  Corn  ---------- ---------- Cotton ---------- 
Parameter  Tripp, SD  Hamilton, IA  Andrews, TX  Coahoma, MS
County Mean μc 56.9 176.4 302  852 
County St. Dev. σc 18.60 28.28 132.0 212.1 
County  CV  32.7% 16.0% 43.7% 24.9% 
APH Price Paph $3.50/bu $3.50/bu $0.52/lb  $0/53/lb 
GRP Maximum 
Protection per acre 
MaxProtgrp
$251.78 $780.57 $244.62 $690.12 
 
Farm Mean 25% Below County Mean
   
  Farm Mean μc 43.0  132.0 227.0 639.0 
  Farm St. Dev. σc 21.1 31.7  148.8  238.6 
    Farm  CV  49.1% 24.0% 65.6% 37.3% 
  Coefficient of 
  Absolute Risk  
  Aversion R 
0.00833 0.00497 0.00843 0.00466 
 
Farm Mean 25% Above County Mean
   
  Farm Mean μc 71.0 221.0  378.0  1065.0 
  Farm St. Dev. σc 34.8 53.1  247.8  397.7 
    Farm  CV  49.0% 24.0% 65.6% 37.3% 
  Coefficient of  
  Absolute Risk  
  Aversion R 
0.00505 0.00297 0.00506 0.00279 
 
   22Table 2.  Current premium subsidy rates for federal crop insurance policies. 
 
Coverage Level  APH Subsidy Rate  GRP Subsidy Rate 
50% 67%  --- 
55% 64%  --- 
60% 64%  --- 
65% 59%  --- 
70% 59%  64% 
75% 55%  64% 
80% 48%  59% 
85% 38%  59% 
90% ---  55% 
 
   23Table 3.  Net benefit of SDC with a standard and with an accelerated payment rate, 
measured as the increase in farmer certainty equivalents ($/ac) relative to APH alone.   
 
County Mean  Yield
* ρfc Standard Rate  Accelerated Rate 
0.3  1.37 0.9%  6.27 4.2% 
0.6  1.68 1.1%  7.99 5.3%  25% Below 
0.9 1.92  1.3%  11.13  7.4% 
0.3 2.28  0.9%  10.38  4.2% 
0.6 2.75  1.1%  13.17  5.3% 
Tripp 
25% Above 
0.9 3.21  1.3%  18.73  7.6% 
0.3  1.25 0.3%  5.00 1.1% 
0.6  1.53 0.3%  6.24 1.3%  25% Below 
0.9  3.36 0.7%  9.87 2.1% 
0.3  2.09 0.3%  8.38 1.1% 
0.6 2.59  0.3%  10.46  1.3% 
Hamilton 
25% Above 
0.9 3.02  0.4%  16.19  2.1% 
0.3  1.89 1.6%  8.23 7.0% 
0.6 2.21  1.9%  10.36  8.8%  25% Below 
0.9 5.59  4.8%  14.33  12.2% 
0.3 3.15  1.6%  13.69  7.0% 
0.6 3.66  1.9%  17.25  8.8% 
Andrews 
25% Above 
0.9 4.13  2.1%  24.10  12.3% 
0.3  1.90 0.6%  8.16 2.4% 
0.6 2.23  0.7%  10.32  3.1%  25% Below 
0.9 7.39  2.2%  14.48  4.3% 
0.3 3.17  0.6%  13.62  2.4% 
0.6 3.72  0.7%  17.18  3.1% 
Coahoma 
25% Above 
0.9 4.19  0.7%  24.28  4.3% 
*Relative to county mean.   
   24Table 4.  Percentage point decrease in the optimal APH coverage level with SDC relative 
to APH alone with the standard and with an accelerated SDC payment rate. 
 
County Mean  Yield
* ρfc Standard Rate  Accelerated Rate 
0.3 5%  10% 
0.6 5%  10%  25% Below 
0.9 5%  35% 
0.3 5%  10% 
0.6 5%  10% 
Tripp 
25% Above 
0.9 5%  35% 
0.3 0%  0% 
0.6 0%  0%  25% Below 
0.9 85%  35% 
0.3 0%  0% 
0.6 0%  0% 
Hamilton 
25% Above 
0.9 0%  35% 
0.3 0%  5% 
0.6 0%  10%  25% Below 
0.9 80%  30% 
0.3 0%  5% 
0.6 0%  10% 
Andrews 
25% Above 
0.9 0%  30% 
0.3 0%  5% 
0.6 0%  5%  25% Below 
0.9 85%  35% 
0.3 0%  5% 
0.6 0%  5% 
Coahoma 
25% Above 
0.9 0%  35% 
*Relative to county mean.   
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Figure 1.  SDC indemnities plotted versus county yield with a standard GRP payment 
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Figure 2.  Certainty equivalent returns for corn in Tripp County South Dakota (top) and 
Hamilton County Iowa (bottom) for the three insurance scenarios (with fair subsidized 
premiums, farm mean 25% below county average, and county-farm correlation of 0.3).   
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